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Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses. To investigate this claim,
we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers U.S. private equity transactions from 1980 to 2005.
 We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing
outcomes to controls similar in terms of industry, size, age, and prior growth.  Relative to controls,
employment at target establishments declines 3 percent over two years post buyout and 6 percent over
five years.  The job losses are concentrated among public-to-private buyouts, and transactions involving
firms in the service and retail sectors. But target firms also create more new jobs at new establishments,
and they acquire and divest establishments more rapidly.  When we consider these additional adjustment
margins, net relative job losses at target firms are less than 1 percent of initial employment.  In contrast,
the sum of gross job creation and destruction at target firms exceeds that of controls by 13 percent
of employment over two years.  In short, private equity buyouts catalyze the creative destruction process
in the labor market, with only a modest net impact on employment.  The creative destruction response
mainly involves a more rapid reallocation of jobs across establishments within target firms.
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1.   Introduction 
The employment impact of leveraged buyouts by private equity firms arouses intense 
concern and strongly held views. For instance, former Danish Prime Minister Poul Rasmussen – 
architect of the European Commission’s recently enacted Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive – contends that “‘leveraged buy-outs’ leave the company saddled with debt and interest 
payments, its workers are laid off, and its assets are sold, … benefiting neither workers nor the 
real economy.” The Service Employees International Union, prominent critic of private equity on 
both sides of the Atlantic, offers this assessment: “Typically it’s easier to decrease costs quickly 
by  cutting  heads,  which  is  why  buyouts  have  typically  been  accompanied  by  layoffs.”
1  
Responding  to  similar  contentions,  several  industry-sponsored  studies  claim  positive 
employment effects of private equity. Examples include European Venture Capital Association 
(2005), British Venture Capital Association (2006), A.T. Kearney (2007), Taylor and Bryant 
(2007), and Shapiro and Pham (2008).  
Efforts to bring data to the issue  are highly  welcome, but these studies have serious 
limitations. First, they rely on surveys with incomplete and perhaps selective responses, raising 
doubts as to whether the data accurately reflect the experiences of employers acquired by private 
equity groups.  Second, the underlying data offer little scope to control for employment changes 
at  comparable  firms.  When  a  firm  backed  by  private  equity  sheds  5%  of  employment,  the 
interpretation depends  greatly on  whether comparable firms  grow by 3% or shrink by 10%.  
Third, these studies do not distinguish cleanly between employment changes at firms backed by 
venture capital and firms backed by other forms of private equity. Both are interesting, but the 
controversy  involves  buyouts  and  other  later-stage  private  equity  transactions,  not  venture 
                                                 
1 See Rasmussen (2008) and remarks attributed to John Adler in Grace Wong, “Private Equity and the Jobs Cut 
Myth”,  CNNMoney.com,  2  May  2007  at  http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/02/markets/pe_jobs/index.htm  (accessed 
August 25, 2011).   2
capital.  Fourth, these studies face major difficulties in measuring organic job growth because the 
underlying  data  sources  do  not  contain  establishment-level  observations.    As  a  result,  it  is 
difficult to disentangle organic growth from the acquisition and sale of particular facilities and 
operating units. Fifth, the lack of establishment-level data also precludes a breakdown of firm-
level  employment  changes  into  job  creation  and  job  destruction  components,  i.e.,  gains  and 
losses at the establishment level. As we show, private equity transactions have different effects 
on these two margins of employment change.
2 
In this study, we construct and analyse a dataset that overcomes these limitations and, at 
the same time, encompasses a much larger set of employers and private equity transactions. We 
rely  on  the  Longitudinal  Business  Database  (LBD)  at  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau  to  follow 
employment in private equity-backed companies in the United States. Using the LBD, we track 
employment before and after private equity transactions at the level of firms and establishments 
– i.e., specific factories, offices, retail outlets and other distinct physical locations where business 
takes  place.  The  LBD  covers  the  entire  nonfarm  private  sector  and  includes  annual  data  on 
employment for about 5 million firms and 6 million establishments.  In addition to its other 
strengths,  the  establishment-level  information  in  the  LBD  enables  us  to  explore  important 
aspects of within-firm restructuring activity in the wake of private equity events. 
We  combine  the  LBD  with  data  from  CapitalIQ  and  other  sources  to  identify  and 
characterize private equity transactions. The resulting matched sample contains about 3,200 U.S. 
firms acquired in private equity transactions from 1980 to 2005 (“target firms”) and 150,000 
U.S. establishments operated by these firms as of the transaction (“target establishments”). To 
construct firm-level controls, we match each target to other firms in the transaction year that are 
                                                 
2  See Service Employees International Union (2007) and Hall (2007) for other critiques.  We discuss the broader 
academic literature on the economic effects of private equity in Section 2.  Few academic studies of private equity 
focus on employment outcomes, and the main exceptions consider data for France and the United Kingdom.    3
comparable in terms of industry, age, size, and single/multi-establishment status. We then follow 
targets  and  matched  controls  over  time.  We  take  a  similar  approach  to  controls  for  target 
establishments.   In our econometric analysis of employment dynamics, we also control for pre-
buyout growth history.  
To  clarify  the  scope  of  our  study,  we  consider  later-stage  changes  in  ownership  and 
control executed and partly financed by private equity firms. In these transactions, the (lead) 
private  equity  firm  acquires  a  controlling  stake  in  the  target  firm  and  retains  a  significant 
oversight role until it “exits” by selling its stake. The transaction typically involves a shift toward 
greater  leverage  in  the  capital  structure  of  the  target  firm  and,  sometimes,  a  change  in  its 
management. We exclude management-led buyouts that do not involve a private equity firm. We 
also exclude startup firms backed by venture capitalists.  
There are three main elements in our analysis of employment outcomes associated with 
private equity transactions. First, we track target establishments for five years before and after 
the transaction, irrespective of whether the target firm owns and operates these establishments 
throughout the entire time window. We compare the paths of employment, job creation, and job 
destruction  at  target  establishments  to  the  paths  at  control  establishments.    By  following 
individual production units over time, this element of our analysis overcomes key shortcomings 
in previous studies of private equity buyouts. Those studies are not able to describe what happens 
to  the  particular  establishments  and  workers  initially  touched  by  private  equity  acquisitions. 
Second,  we  undertake  a  firm-level  analysis  to  encompass  job  creation  at  “greenfield” 
establishments opened after the private equity transaction.  We identify and quantify greenfield 
job creation by target firms backed by private equity and compare with greenfield job creation by 
control  firms.    Our  firm-level  analysis  also  captures  employment  changes  associated  with 
acquisitions  and  divestitures.    Third,  we  draw  on  the  first  two  elements  of  our  analysis  to   4
quantify  the  effects  of  private  equity  transactions  on  the  reallocation  of  jobs  across 
establishments within and between firms.  Taken together, the various elements of our analysis 
yield a much fuller and richer picture of the relationship between private equity transactions and 
employment outcomes. 
Our establishment-level analysis yields three main findings: First, employment shrinks 
more  rapidly,  on  average,  at  target  establishments  than  at  controls  after  private  equity 
transactions.  The  average  cumulative  difference  in  favor  of  controls  is  about  3%  of  initial 
employment  over  two  years  and  6%  over  five  years.    Second,  the  larger  post-transaction 
employment declines at target establishments entirely reflect higher rates of job destruction at 
shrinking  and  exiting  establishments.    In  fact,  the  post-transaction  creation  of  new  jobs  at 
expanding establishments is greater for targets than controls. Third, mean employment growth 
rates are similar for target and control establishments in the two years before buyout, and targets 
grow more rapidly in the transaction year. 
The establishment-level analysis does not fully answer the question of how employment 
evolves in the wake of private equity transactions.  Most important, it misses job creation at 
newly opened establishments, whether by target or control firms.  To capture this aspect of job 
creation, we move to a firm-level analysis and identify new establishments opened after the 
private equity transaction.  The combination of firm and establishment data in the LBD is what 
enables us to isolate and quantify greenfield job creation.  For this part of our analysis, we 
shorten the time window to two years post transaction.  Lengthening the window involves a 
greater incidence and complexity of ownership changes, threatening the integrity of our firm-
level longitudinal linkages or forcing us to rely on a selected sample. 
Target firms engage in more greenfield job creation than control firms, with a cumulative 
two-year difference amounting to almost 2% of transaction-year employment.  That is, greater   5
greenfield job creation partly offsets the relative employment drop at target establishments in the 
wake of private equity transactions.  Our firm-level analysis also yields another interesting result: 
Private equity targets engage in more acquisitions and more divestitures than controls. Over the 
first two years post buyout, the employment-weighted acquisition rate is almost 6 percentage 
points  higher  at  target  firms,  and  the  divestiture  rate  is  almost  3  percentage  points  higher.  
Summing  over  job  creation  and  destruction  at  continuing  establishments,  job  losses  at 
establishments that shut down, job gains at greenfield establishments, and the contributions of 
acquisitions and divestitures, employment shrinks by less than 1% at target firms relative to 
controls in the first two years after private equity buyouts.  
We uncover a much larger response in the pace of job reallocation.  Specifically, over the 
first  two  years  after  the  transaction,  establishment-level  job  gains  and  losses  at  target  firms 
exceed gains and losses at controls by 13% of initial employment.  This extra job creation and 
destruction activity amounts to more than 30% of baseline job reallocation rates at control firms.  
A  more  rapid  pace  of  organic  job  creation  and  destruction  accounts  for  43%  of  the  extra 
reallocation  activity  at  target  firms,  and  a  more  rapid  pace  of  acquisitions  and  divestitures 
accounts for the rest. These results indicate that private equity buyouts catalyze the creative 
destruction process, at least as measured by job creation and destruction and by the transfer of 
production units between firms.   
We also document large outcome differences by type of private equity transaction and by 
industry.  The most visible transactions involve publicly traded firms that come under private 
equity control.  These public-to-private cases account for a small share of transactions but are 
typically larger than other deals, and they attract the lion’s share of media attention. As it turns 
out, target-firm employment losses are much greater in public-to-private transactions than other 
private equity buyouts.  Relative to controls, employment shrinks by 10% of initial employment   6
in the first two years after private equity buyouts of publicly traded firms.  There are also large 
differences by industry. In the manufacturing sector, which accounts for about a quarter of U.S. 
private equity transactions, post-buyout growth at target establishments is only slightly slower 
than  at  controls.  In  contrast,  Services  and  especially  Retail  Trade  exhibit  much  larger 
employment declines at target establishments in the wake of private equity buyouts. 
The next section briefly reviews related research.  Section 3 describes the construction of 
the  datasets  for  our  analysis,  and  Section  4  motivates  and  explains  our  empirical  methods.  
Sections 5 and 6 present our main establishment-level and firm-level analyses.  Section 7 draws 
out the implications for job reallocation and the role of private equity in the creative destruction 
process. Section 8 highlights important outcome differences by industry and type of transaction, 
and Section 9 offers concluding remarks. 
2.   Related Work 
Economists hold a longstanding interest in how ownership changes affect productivity 
and  employment.  Examples  include  Lichtenberg  and  Siegel  (1987),  Long  and  Ravenscraft 
(1993), McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), and Harris, Siegel and Wright (2005).  One ownership 
change that attracts particular attention is the acquisition of firms by professional private equity 
investors. Jensen (1989) and Shleifer and Summers (1988), among others, discuss the economic 
effects  of  private  equity  transactions  based  largely  on  case  study  evidence.  Kaplan  and 
Strömberg  (2009)  provide  a  useful  overview  of  research  on  the  economic  effects  of  private 
equity.   
Few previous studies focus on the employment effects of private equity transactions, and 
the  exceptions  typically  rely  on  small  samples  dictated  by  data  availability.  Kaplan  (1989) 
considers 76 public-to-private leveraged buyouts (LBOs) during the 1980s. He finds that the 
median firm lost 12% of employment on an industry-adjusted basis from the end of the fiscal   7
year prior to the private equity transaction to the end of the fiscal year after the transaction. After 
dropping target firms with asset sales or purchases that exceed 10% of total value, the adjusted 
employment  decline  is  6.2%  for  the  remaining  24  firms.  Muscarella  and  Vetsuypens  (1990) 
consider 72 firms that completed an initial public offering (IPO) after an LBO between 1983 and 
1987.  For the 26 firms they can track, employment declines by an average of 0.6% between the 
LBO and the IPO. This outcome represents less employment growth than 92% of the publicly 
traded firms in Compustat.  
In  work  close  in  spirit to  our  study,  Lichtenberg  and  Siegel  (1990)  use  U.S.  Census 
Bureau  data  to  examine  changes  in  employment  at  the  manufacturing  plants  of  131  firms 
undergoing buyouts between 1981 and 1986.  On an industry-adjusted basis, employment falls 
by  1.2%  per  year  after  buyout,  as  compared  to  a  1.9%  annual  rate  of  decline  beforehand.  
Declines are larger for non-production workers than blue-collar workers. Wright, Thompson and 
Robbie (1992) and Amess and Wright  (2007)  similarly find that buyouts in the UK lead to 
modest employment declines. These studies follow overall employment at a set of firms, and 
contrast it with aggregate employment at matching firms.
3  Boucly, Sraer and Thesmar (2009) 
find that employment grows much more rapidly at target firms than at controls in the wake of 
French private equity transactions.  They attribute this result to an important role for private 
equity in relaxing financing constraints for target firms in France.   
These  studies  share  certain  weaknesses.  First,  they  focus  on  the  company-wide 
employment of firms backed by private equity. Thus, the sale of a division or other business unit 
is typically counted as an employment loss, even if the sold business unit continues with the 
same number of employees under new ownership. Likewise, the acquisition of a division or other 
                                                 
3 The samples in these UK studies include management-led deals (management buyouts), which need not involve a 
financial  sponsor  that  acquires  a  controlling  stake  in  the  target  firm.    Management-led  deals  potentially  differ 
substantially from the traditional private equity transactions that we consider.    8
business unit is counted as an employment gain, even if there is no employment change at the 
business  unit  itself.    Several  studies  attempt  to  address  this  issue  by  dropping  buyouts  that 
involve substantial asset sales, but this sample restriction may greatly influence the results, given 
the extent of “asset shuffling” by firms backed by private equity. 
Second,  previous  U.S.  studies  consider  a  modest  number  of  deals  in  the  1980s.  The 
private equity industry is now much larger. Using inflation-adjusted dollars, fundraising by U.S. 
private equity groups rose 36-fold from 1985 to 1998 and more than 100-fold by 2006.
4 The 
tremendous growth in private equity activity allows us to examine a much larger set of deals.  
Moreover, the nature of private equity activity has also changed over time – competition for 
attractive deals has intensified, and many private equity firms now have a strong operational 
orientation, as opposed to the financial engineering approach that characterized many groups 
during the 1980s. 
Third, previous U.S. studies of private equity deals rely on highly selected samples, and 
most  studies  treat  the  firm  as  the  unit  of  analysis.    The  selected  nature  of  the  sample  is  a 
potentially important source of bias in the findings. The handful of previous studies that treat 
establishments as the unit of observation are typically restricted to the manufacturing sector, and 
even then face limitations in their ability to track establishment or firm closings.   It is also 
desirable to look beyond the public-to-private transactions that dominate earlier samples, but 
which account for a minority of transactions. 
Our study overcomes these weaknesses, as we have explained. In addition, we exploit the 
establishment-level aspect of our data to examine job creation and job destruction outcomes, as 
well as net employment changes. In this regard, we are motivated in part by previous work that 
documents  a  rapid  pace  of  establishment-level  job  creation  and  destruction.  Davis  and 
                                                 
4 Based on Thomson Reuters VentureXpert, http://www.venturexpert.com (accessed August 20, 2011).    9
Haltiwanger  (1999)  review  work  in  this  area.    Earlier  empirical  work  also  shows  that  the 
reallocation  of  jobs  and  workers  across  establishments  plays  a  major  role  in  medium-term 
productivity gains. Many important theoretical models also feature distinct roles for the creation 
and destruction margins of employment  adjustment. Caballero (2007)  provides an insightful, 
detailed analysis and extensive references to the relevant literature. 
3.   Constructing the Analysis Samples 
Our analysis requires a comprehensive database of private equity transactions and the 
matching of target firms to firm-level and establishment-level records in the LBD.  This section 
describes the data construction process and the resulting samples.  
A.     Identifying private equity transactions 
 
CapitalIQ has specialized in tracking private equity deals on a worldwide basis since 
1999 and, through extensive research, has backfilled transactions prior to 1999.
5  We consider all 
recorded transactions in CapitalIQ that closed between January 1980 and December 2005. We 
then impose two sample restrictions. First, we restrict attention to transactions that entail some 
use of leverage. Many transactions that do not involve leverage are venture capital investments 
rather than private equity investments in mature firms. To keep the focus on private equity, we 
delete  transactions  not  classified  by  CapitalIQ  as  “going  private,”  “leveraged  buyout,” 
“management buyout,” “platform,” or a similar term.  This approach excludes “growth buyouts” 
and “expansion capital” transactions that involve the purchase of a minority stake using little or 
no leverage. These transactions do not fit the classic profile of leveraged buyouts, although they 
may share other characteristics of private equity transactions. Second, the CapitalIQ database 
includes a number of transactions that do not involve a financial sponsor, i.e., a private equity 
                                                 
5  Most  data  services  tracking  private  equity  transactions  were  not  established  until  the  late  1990s.  The  most 
comprehensive exception, SDC VentureXpert, mainly focused on capturing venture capital transactions until the 
mid-1990s. See Stromberg (2007) for a discussion of the completeness of the CapitalIQ database.   10
firm. We delete these deals as well. While transactions in which a management team takes a firm 
private using its own resources are interesting, they are not the focus of our study or the recent 
controversies surrounding private equity activity.  
After  restricting  the  sample  in  these  two  ways,  the  resulting  database  contains  about 
11,000  transactions  worldwide.  Dropping  transactions  that  involve  firms  with  foreign 
headquarters leaves about 5,000 U.S. target firms acquired in private equity transactions between 
1980 and 2005.  (We do not consider U.S. establishments operated by foreign targets.) To fill out 
our information about private equity transactions and target firms, we supplement the data drawn 
from CapitalIQ with data from Dealogic, Thomson Reuters SDC, VentureXpert databases, and 
news  stories.  Dealogic,  in  particular,  often  contains  greater  detail  about  transaction 
characteristics. Other useful information in the supplementary sources includes alternative names 
associated with target firms and their later acquisitions and sales. 
B.    Matching to LBD Records  
The LBD derives from the Census Bureau’s Business Register, which contains annual 
data on U.S. businesses with paid employees. The LBD covers the entire nonfarm private sector 
from 1976 to 2005. In recent years, it contains over 6 million establishment records and almost 5 
million  firm  records  per  year.    The  Business  Register  and  the  LBD  draw  on  administrative 
records and survey sources for data on firms and their establishments.  Core data items include 
employment,  payroll,  four-digit  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  or  six-digit  North 
American Industrial Classification (NAICS), employer identification numbers, business names, 
and information about location.
6  Identifiers in the LBD files enable us to compute growth rate 
measures for establishments and firms and to track their entry and exit and ownership changes. 
                                                 
6 Sales data in the Business Register are available annually from 1994 and once every five years in earlier years.    11
Firms  in  the  LBD  are  defined  based  on  operational  control,  and  all  establishments  majority 
owned by a parent firm are included in the parent’s activity measures.  
To  merge  data  on  private  equity  transactions  into  the  LBD,  we  match  names  and 
addresses of private equity portfolio firms (i.e., target firms) to LBD name and address records.  
To cope with timing differences between datasets, we search over a three-year window in the 
LBD centered on the transaction year for each target firm. We adopt a conservative approach to 
matching that requires either an exact match on name or address or an approximate match on 
both name and address according to probability-based matching algorithms.  Our procedures 
match about 65% of target firms to the LBD, 70% on a value-weighted basis, yielding about 
3200 matched targets firms. Once matched, firm-establishment links in the LBD serve to identify 
all establishments owned by target firms as of the private equity transaction.  Matched target 
firms operate about 150,000 U.S. establishments as of the transaction year. LBD longitudinal 
links allows us to follow individual firms and establishments over time.  As discussed below, 
tracking firms is more challenging than tracking establishments, which influences the design of 
our firm-level analysis sample.  
Given our interest in employment dynamics, the relationship of the LBD employment 
measure to the timing of private equity transactions requires careful treatment.  The LBD reports 
total employment in the payroll period containing the week of March 12th. Accordingly, for 
private equity transactions that close before October 1, LBD employment in March of the same 
calendar year serves as our contemporaneous employment measure.  We assign transactions that 
close on or after October 1 in year t to year  1 + t  for purposes of our analysis, treating the LBD 
employment value in March of  1 + t as the contemporaneous measure.  October is the natural 
cutoff because it lies midway between March-to-March employment changes in the LBD.     12
Figure  1  shows  the  number  of  U.S.  target  firm  acquisitions  by  year  and  the  number 
matched to the LBD.  It is apparent that the number of private equity transactions grew rapidly 
beginning in the mid-1990s. Table 1 shows the enterprise value (debt plus equity, as valued at 
the time of the transaction) of all private equity targets and the matched targets by sub-periods 
(we group years together in Table 1 to avoid disclosing individual firm data given the skewed 
distribution of values). The enterprise value of private equity acquisitions is very large in the 
later years, reaching 420 billion in the 2000-2005 period.  Figure 2 displays employment data for 
our matched target firms.  For example, target firms acquired in 2005 and identified in the LBD 
account  for  0.83%  of  total  nonfarm  business  employment  in  2005.    Given  the  extent  of 
unmatched targets, the full set of firms that came under private equity control in 2005 accounts 
for well over one percent of private sector employment.  Based on our data, it is reasonable to 
infer that more than 7 percent of private sector employment came under private equity control at 
some point in the ten-year period from 1998 to 2007.
7   
C.    Target Firms and Establishments in the Analysis Samples  
Our study considers three related samples. For descriptive statistics on the number and 
volume of private equity transactions and their distribution by industry and firm characteristics, 
we consider all matched targets through 2005. For our establishment-level analysis sample, we 
consider private equity transactions from 1980 to 2000.  This sample allows us to track target 
establishments  for  five  years  before  and  after  the  buyout  year.    For  our  firm-level  analysis 
sample, we consider transactions from 1980 to 2003, so that we can track firm-level outcomes 
for two years post-transaction. Table 2 reports summary statistics on matched targets for our 
three analysis samples. 
                                                 
7 We arrive at this inference by summing the employment percentages of matched targets from 1998 to 2005, 
dividing the sum by 0.7 to account for unmatched targets, and making the assumption (supported by other data 
sources) that private equity activity continued at record levels in 2006 and the first half of 2007.   13
4.   Empirical Methods 
This  section  describes  key  methodological  choices  in  our  empirical  study.  The  first 
relates to the unit of analysis.  Section 5 considers establishments owned by a target firm in the 
year  of  a  private  equity  transaction.    We  track  these  units  over  time,  irrespective  of  their 
ownership  in  earlier  or  later  years.    For  example,  if  the  target  firm  goes  public  or  sells  an 
establishment, we continue to track that establishment and associate it with the transaction event.  
Section 6 takes a different approach, treating the firm as the unit of analysis. The firm-level 
approach  allows  us  to  capture  greenfield  job  creation  and  the  acquisition  and  sale  of 
establishments after the private equity transaction. 
The  second  key  choice  relates  to  controls.  We  need  suitable  controls  because  the 
distribution  of  private  equity  transactions  across  industries  and  by  firm  and  establishment 
characteristics is not random. For example, practitioner accounts often suggest a concentration of 
transactions in industries undergoing significant restructurings due to regulatory action, foreign 
competition,  or  technological  change.    Target  firms  in  our  data  are  disproportionately 
concentrated in manufacturing, information services, and accommodation and food services, as 
seen in Figures 3A and 3B.  Target firms are also larger and older than the average firm, as 
shown in Figure 4.  The literature on firm dynamics concludes that growth and volatility vary 
systematically with firm size and age.  See, for example, Caves (1998), Davis et al. (2007), and 
Haltiwanger,  Jarmin  and  Miranda  (2010).    Thus,  it  is  important  to  control  for  these 
characteristics  when  evaluating  the  effect  of  private  equity  transactions  on  growth  and 
reallocation outcomes. 
The huge number of firms and establishments in the LBD allows us to control for a full 
set of interactions among industry, size, age, multi-unit status, and transaction year.  We sort   14
target firms into cells defined by the cross product of these characteristics.
8  We then identify all 
firms in the LBD not backed by private equity that fall into the same cell as a given target firm, 
and we treat those firms as controls. Specifically, we control for the interaction of 72 two-digit 
industries,  10  firm  size  categories,  6  firm  age  categories,  a  binary  indicator  for  firms  with 
multiple establishments, and 24 distinct transaction years.  The cross product of these categorical 
variables yields over 8,000 control cells per year.  Of course, many cells are unpopulated, but the 
richness of our controls is evident.  In our regression analysis, we also control for pre-transaction 
employment growth histories.  We follow the same approach in the establishment-level analysis.  
To obtain controls for a given target establishment, we select all establishments in the same 
control  cell  from  among  the  set  of  active  establishments  in  the  transaction  year,  excluding 
establishments owned by a firm under private equity control.  
A  related  choice  involves  our  statistical  approach  to  estimating  the  effects  of  private 
equity  transactions  on  employment  outcomes.  We  consider  nonparametric  comparisons  that 
control  for  the  cross-product  of  our  categorical  variables,  semi-parametric  regressions  that 
include additional controls, and propensity score methods.    Ideally, we would like to estimate 
the average treatment effect on the treated, i.e., the average effect of private equity buyouts on 
target firms.  As discussed in Woolridge (2002, chapter 18), consistent estimation of average 
treatment effects requires conditional mean independence: conditional on the controls and the 
treatment  indicator,  outcomes  for  the  treated  and  non-treated  are  independently  distributed.  
Compared  to  previous  research,  our  rich  set  of  controls  lends  greater  plausibility  to  this 
identifying assumption.   
                                                 
8 We define industry for multi-unit firms based on the modal industry of their establishments, computed on an 
employment-weighted basis.   
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Even if one questions the assumption of conditional mean independence, our study yields 
a rich set of new findings about employment outcomes at private equity targets. These findings 
throw light on alternative views about the economic role of private equity, as we discuss below.  
Our findings also provide useful evidence for formulating and evaluating theoretical models of 
private equity behavior and effects.    
A  fourth  choice  relates  to  the  time  window  around  private  equity  transactions.  Our 
establishment-level analysis considers employment outcomes for five years on either side of a 
private equity transaction.  Five years is a typical holding period for target firms (Stromberg 
2007).    For  our  firm-level  analysis,  we  must  confront  the  reorganization  of  firms  through 
mergers, ownership changes, partial divestitures, and acquisitions of establishments from other 
firms. Because it tracks both firms and establishments over time and contemporaneously links 
establishments to firms, the LBD offers greater scope for identifying these changes than most 
other business-level datasets.  Nevertheless, some private equity targets undergo complex post-
buyout restructurings that challenge the maintenance of high-integrity longitudinal links.  We 
deal with this challenge in two ways.  First, our firm-level analysis considers a relatively short 
window of two years after each buyout transaction, thereby limiting the linkage issues that arise 
from complex firm-level reorganizations.  Second, we use our establishment-level data to assess 
the impact of potential sample selection bias in our firm-level analysis.    
Before proceeding, we define our employment and growth rate measures. Let   be 
employment at establishment or firm i in year t; i.e., the number of workers on the payroll in the 
pay period covering March 12.  The employment growth rate is  , where 
it E
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.
9  The employment growth rate at any higher level of aggregation is the 
weighted  mean  of  establishment  or  firm  growth  rates  given  by  ,  where 
.  We  consider  the  respective  contributions  of  expanding  and  shrinking 
establishments,  establishment  entry  and  exit,  and  acquisitions  and  divestitures  to  firm-level 
employment  changes,  and  compare  outcomes  between  targets  and  controls  on  each  of  these 
adjustment margins.  
5.    Establishment-Level Analysis 
A.   Nonparametric comparisons 
We  begin  with  an  “event  study”  that  compares  outcomes  at  target  establishments  to 
outcomes at control establishments.  To encompass a five-year window before and after buyout 
years,  we  consider  transactions  in  the  1980-2000  period.  As  discussed  above,  we  construct 
control cells as the cross product of industry, size of parent firm, age of parent firm, multi-unit 
status, and transaction year.  Our firm size categories are 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 
250-499, 500-999, 1000-2499, 2500-4999, 5000-9999, and 10000 or more employees.  Our firm 
age categories are 0-5 years, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, and 21 or more years.
10 We use firm size and 
age measures to facilitate comparisons to our firm-level analysis below.  Replacing firm size and 
age measures with establishment measures yields similar results. 
The solid curve in Figure 5a shows the employment path of target establishments around 
the transaction year.  Establishments that came under private equity ownership between 1980 and 
2000 employed 2.3 million workers  as of the transaction  year. The dashed curve shows the 
                                                 
9 This growth rate measure has become standard in analyses of establishment and firm dynamics, because it shares 
some useful properties of log differences while also accommodating entry and exit. See Davis et al. (1996) and 
Tornqvist, Vartia, and Vartia (1985) for discussion.  
10  Following  Davis  et.  al.  (2009),  when  a  firm  first  appears  in  the  LBD,  we  assign  it  the  age  of  its  oldest 
establishment.  We then increment the firm’s age by one year for each year it continues as a legal entity in the LBD.  
In this way, we avoid arbitrary increases or decreases in firm age due to the sale and purchase of establishments. 
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counterfactual path of employment at targets had they grown at the same rate as controls. To 
construct this counterfactual, we first rescale the employment of controls to match that of targets 
cell by cell in the transaction year.  We then apply the actual growth rates of the controls to 
generate the dashed curve.
11 Comparing the solid and dashed curves highlights the critical need 
to evaluate target outcomes relative to controls.  In particular, a simple difference-in-difference 
analysis of target outcomes before and after transaction years would produce a highly misleading 
impression about the employment effects of private equity buyouts.  
  Figure 5b tracks mean employment growth rate differences between target and control 
establishments from 5 years before to 5 years after the transaction year. Perhaps surprisingly, 
Figure 5b shows no systematic pattern of slower job growth at targets in the years leading up to 
buyout transactions. In the transaction year itself, employment growth at targets is actually 2 
percentage points higher than at controls. However, there is a clear pattern of slower growth at 
targets  post  buyout,  with  growth  differentials  ranging  from  0.5%  to  2%  per  year.  These 
differentials cumulate to 3.2% of employment in the first two years post buyout and 6.4% over 
five years. These results accommodate heterogeneous treatment effects over the cross product of 
industry, firm size, firm age, multi-unit status, and year of transaction. They recover the average 
treatment effect on the treated under the assumption of conditional mean independence, as we 
discussed above.   
  Previous research finds very large gross job flows relative to net employment changes 
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999), raising the question of how employment responds to private 
equity transactions on job creation and destruction margins.  Figure 6 tells an important story in 
this regard: Slower employment growth at private equity targets post buyout entirely reflects a 
                                                 
11 To be precise, we calculate the weighted mean growth rate over cells using the weights defined at the end of 
Section 4.  The cell-level weights evolve over time in line with the growth experiences of targets (solid curve) and 
controls (dashed curve).  For cells with multiple controls, each control receives equal weight.    18
greater  pace  of  job  destruction.    Indeed,  gross  job  creation  rates  are  greater  at  target 
establishments in the wake of buyouts.  These results are interesting for at least two reasons.  
First, they indicate that private equity buyouts accelerate the pace of employment change on 
destruction and creation margins, a theme we return to below. Second, Figure 6b confirms that 
jobs at target establishments are at greater risk post buyout than jobs at controls. As seen in 
Figure 7, about half of this greater risk reflects a higher post-buyout shutdown propensity at 
target establishments.  
B.    Regression Analysis  
We turn now to a regression analysis that allows for additional controls and an easy 
calculation of standard errors in the estimated effects of private equity transactions. Table 3 
reports establishment-level regression results for the transaction year and five subsequent years. 
Each regression involves the matched target establishments in transactions from 1980 to 2000 
and  their  corresponding  control  establishments.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  employment 
growth rate in the indicated year following the buyout. The first column in Table 3 reports the 
mean growth rate differentials from Figure 5b. The second and third columns report results for 
semi-parametric regressions that include controls for the pre-buyout growth history of parent and 
target firms.   
We include two variables to control for pre-buyout history.  One variable considers the 
set of establishments owned by the target firm as of year 0 (the transaction year).  We set the 
value of this variable to the employment growth rate of these establishments from year -3 to year 
-1.  A second variable considers the parent firm that owned these establishments in year -3.  If 
ownership was split across multiple firms in year -3, we select the firm with the largest share of 
employment among these establishments.  We then set the second variable to the employment   19
growth  rate  of  that  firm  from  year  -3  to  year  -1.    Often,  but  not  always,  these  two  control 
variables take on the same value.   
The Table 3 regressions contain a large battery of additional controls. The column headed 
“ATE=ATE1” includes a fully interacted set of controls for two-digit industry, firm size, firm 
age, multi-unit status, and year.  This specification posits a common treatment effect, given by 
the coefficient on an indicator variable for target establishments in private equity transactions. 
The column headed “ATE1 Heterogeneous” includes the same set of controls, but relaxes the 
assumption of uniform treatment effects by interacting the private equity indicator with the 6 
firm age categories, 10 firm size categories, and the two measures of pre-buyout growth history.  
This specification is more restrictive than the nonparametric specification in some respects but 
less restrictive in the inclusion of controls for pre-buyout growth history and in allowing the 
treatment effect to vary with pre-buyout employment growth.  To recover the average treatment 
effect on the treated in this case, we compute a weighted average of the heterogeneous estimated 
treatment effects, using cell-level employment weights of targets in the transaction year.   We 
calculate standard errors by the Delta method. 
As seen in Table 3, the nonparametric and semi-parametric specifications deliver similar 
results.    The  two  semi-parametric  regressions  also  yield  small  standard  errors  and  tightly 
estimated  effects  of  private  equity  transactions.    Five-year  cumulative  employment  losses  at 
targets range from -4.7% to -6.4%, depending on specification, with somewhat smaller losses in 
the semi-parametric specifications.
12  In short, the evidence says that private equity buyouts lead 
to deeper job losses at establishments in operation as of the transaction year.  
                                                 
12 Smaller losses in the semi-parametric specifications point to a modest tendency for private equity to target firms 
with weaker employment growth prospects, which differs somewhat from the inference suggested by the pre-buyout 
comparison in Figure 5b.  Recall that Figure 5 involves a comparison of growth rates between target and control 
establishments.  In contrast, the semi-parametric regressions reported in Table 3 contain controls for the pre-buyout 
growth history of parent firms.    20
6.    Firm-Level Analysis 
A.  Tracking Firms 
Section 5 considers outcomes for establishments owned by target firms at the time of the 
deal.  We now shift to a firm-level analysis to capture new establishments opened after the deal 
as well as post-buyout acquisitions and divestitures. By necessity, we restrict attention to target 
firms that we can track post buyout.  While we can readily track establishments over time in the 
LBD, tracking firms is more challenging for two reasons: the disappearance of firm identifiers 
(IDs)  in  some  circumstances,  and  irregularities  in  Census  Bureau  tracking  of  private  equity 
targets involved in divisional sales. 
The disappearance of a firm identifier (ID) in the LBD can occur for various reasons. One 
is the death of a firm and closure of its establishments.  Firm death in this sense presents no 
problem for our analysis, and we capture such events whether they involve target or control 
firms.  A more difficult situation involves a firm ID in year 0 that disappears in later years, even 
though some of the establishments owned by the firm continue to operate. This situation can 
arise because of a merger or complex reorganization (e.g. different components of the original 
firm are bought by multiple existing firms). It is inherently difficult to define and measure firm 
growth when the original legal entity has ceased to exist, and we exclude these observations in 
our firm-level analysis.  To reduce the number of observations lost for this reason, we limit our 
firm-level analysis to years 1 and 2 after the transaction.  
In  the  course  of  our  data  development  and  analysis,  we  discovered  that  the  Census 
Bureau did not accurately track firm IDs in certain private equity transactions.  Inaccuracies 
sometimes occurred when a private equity group acquired one or more divisions of a corporate 
entity, but not the whole firm.  In principle, the Census Bureau’s Annual Company Organization 
Survey (sent to all large multi-unit companies) yields data that enables the Census to track these   21
divisional sales.  However, we identified divisional sales in which the firm ID of the (new) target 
firm  remained  the  same  as  the  ID  of  the  selling  firm.    This  problem  did  not  affect  the 
establishment-level analysis in Section 5, because we could rely on an alternative identifier – the 
Employer  Identification  Number  (EIN)  –  to  accurately  identify,  as  of  the  transaction  year, 
establishments  involved  in  divisional  sales.    Unfortunately,  EINs  are  unsuitable  for  tracking 
firms post buyout because new and acquired establishments may obtain new EINs.  In light of 
this issue, we exclude divisional cases from our firm-level analysis for those cases when Census 
does not provide an accurate ID for the target firm. 
We more fully discuss tracking issues related to divisional sales and our use of EINs in 
the web appendix.  The web appendix also repeats the establishment-level analysis of Section 5 
excluding establishments owned by divisional targets with inaccurate IDs.  The pattern of results 
for this subsample is quite similar to the results in Section 5, although the subsample yields 
somewhat  smaller  employment  losses  at  targets  relative  to  controls.    The  similarity  of  the 
establishment-based results for the full sample and the subsample suggests that our firm-level 
analysis is not seriously distorted by the inability to accurately track firm IDs for some divisional 
sales.      
For the firm-level analysis, we expand the sample period to run through 2003.
13 Table 2 
reports summary statistics for various firm-level samples.  Our full matched sample contains 
2265 target firms from 1980 to 2003.  They account for about 4.3 million workers and 104,000 
establishments as of the transaction year.  Excluding the divisional, EIN cases that lack accurate 
firm IDs yields 1874 target firms with about 3.4 million workers and 79,000 establishments.
14  
                                                 
13 A firm-level analysis for the period from 1980 to 2000 yields similar results. 
14 Although our firm-level analysis sample excludes some transactions covered by the establishment-level analysis, 
extending the sample period through 2003 captures a large number of more recent transactions, as seen in Figures 1 
and 2. As a result, the firm-level analysis sample actually covers more employment. 
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Further  restricting  attention  to  firms  that  we  can  track  for  two  years  after  the  buyout  year, 
including deaths, yields a sample of 1,374 firms and 3.2 million workers.  This sample represents 
73 percent of the matched sample with accurate firm IDs and 93 percent of their employment.  
The latter statistic is more relevant given our focus on employment-weighted outcomes.  
B.  Firm-level Results 
Our  firm-level  analysis  considers  the  same  type  of  semi-parametric  regression 
specifications  as  in  Table  3.  Now,  however,  we  explore  employment  responses  on  several 
adjustment  margins,  including  the  entry  of  new  establishments  post  buyout.  As  before,  the 
regressions include the pre-buyout growth variables and the cross product of industry, firm size 
categories, firm age categories, multi-unit status, and transaction year as controls. We weight 
observations by employment, as before.  To obtain the effect of interest, we rely on indicator 
variables  for  target  firms.    Table  4  presents  the  firm-level  regression  results  for  cumulative 
responses over the first two years post buyout. 
The top row in Table 4 shows results using firm-level employment growth rates as the 
dependent  variable.  Again,  we  report  results  for  an  ATE=ATE1  specification  that  posits  a 
uniform treatment effect, and for an ATE1 Heterogeneous specification that allows treatment 
effects to vary with pre-buyout history and across firm age and size categories. The top row in 
Table 4 says that target firms shrink more rapidly than controls in the two-year period after 
buyouts – by 0.88 percentage points in the ATE=ATE1 specification and 0.65 percentage points 
in the ATE1 Heterogeneous specification.  These estimated effects are much smaller than the 
cumulative two-year differences of 2.5 and 2.9 points, respectively, in Table 3.  This comparison 
suggests that the additional adjustment margins captured by the firm-level analysis alters the 
picture of how private equity transactions affect employment outcomes.     23
The remaining rows in Table 4 address the issue directly in the firm-level sample.  Focus 
on the ATE1 Heterogeneous specification, and consider first the results for “Continuers” and 
“Deaths”.  These  are  the  adjustment  margins  captured  in  the  establishment-level  analysis.
15  
Summing these two components yields a two-year employment growth rate differential of -5.49 
percentage points (-1.36 – 4.13) for targets, a large difference.  But target firms create more new 
jobs at new establishments in the first two years after buyouts, a difference of 1.87 points in 
favor  of  targets.    Combining  these  three  adjustment  margins  yields  a  differential  of  -3.62 
percentage  points  for  targets.    Finally,  bringing  in  the  role  of  acquisitions  and  divestitures 
reduces this differential to  -0.81 points, close to the estimated differential in the top row.
16  
Thus, the overall impact of private equity transactions on firm-level employment growth is quite 
modest.  
Another noteworthy aspect of Table 4 involves the intensity of reallocation activity at 
target  firms.    In  particular,  target  firms  exhibit  substantially  greater  job  destruction  in 
establishment shutdowns, more job creation at establishment births, more employment losses 
through divestitures, and greater employment gains through acquisitions. In other words, target 
firms  undergo  more  job  reallocation  activity  post  buyout  than  control  firms.  These  results 
support the view that private equity is a catalyst for creative destruction as measured by job 
creation and destruction and the purchase and sale of business units.  We develop this theme 
more fully in the next section.  
As a robustness check, we also estimate the average treatment effect of private equity 
buyouts  on  firm-level  employment  growth  using  propensity  score  methods.    We  construct 
propensity scores by fitting logit specifications, one for each transaction year, for the likelihood 
                                                 
15 Note that for this to be fully comparable it would have to include establishments that were divested but continue 
to operate under different ownership. 
16 The control variables take on different values in different rows of Table 4, so the estimated effects for the various 
adjustment margins need not sum to the exact value of the net estimated effect in the top row.   24
that a firm becomes  a  private equity target.  The logit specification includes the pre-buyout 
growth variables and the cross product of industry, firm size categories, firm age categories, and 
multi-unit status.   Our second-stage regression includes an indicator for private equity targets, as 
before, plus the propensity score measure interacted with year effects. Using this second-stage 
regression, we estimate that a private equity buyout raises firm-level employment growth by 
0.26 percentage points in the first two years post buyout, with a standard error of 0.18 points.
17 
Thus, under the propensity score approach, we cannot reject the hypothesis that private equity 
transactions have zero net impact on employment growth at target firms.  
  To conclude this section, it is worth stressing that our firm-level and establishment-level 
regression analyses answer different questions. The establishment-level analysis tells us what 
happens to employment at establishments owned by target firms as of the transaction year. The 
firm-level analysis tells us what happens to employment at target firms, overall and on various 
adjustment margins.  In practice, the main difference is that the firm-level analysis picks up large 
differentials between targets and controls in job creation at newly opened establishments and in 
employment changes associated with acquisitions and divestitures.  More subtle differences are 
also present.  Consider, for example, a target establishment sold to another firm one year after 
the buyout transaction.  Employment changes at this firm from year 1 to year 2 are captured in 
the establishment-level analysis but not the firm-level analysis.  
7.    Private Equity: Agents of Change or Agents of Restructuring? 
Table  4  and  Figure  6  provide  evidence  that  private  equity  transactions  function  as 
catalysts for creative destruction. This evidence is consistent with two distinct hypotheses.  One 
                                                 
17 The standard errors are not adjusted for the first-stage estimation. As Woolridge (2002) notes, an advantage of 
including controls directly in the main regression is that it simplifies the computation of standard errors.  He also 
points  out  that  propensity  score  methods  often  yield  similar  results  to  methods  that  use  controls  in  the  main 
regression.  When estimated with a linear probability model, a propensity score approach is equivalent to a one-stage 
approach that introduces the controls directly into the main regression.  
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hypothesis holds that private equity acts as an agent of change – inducing some target firms to 
expand relative to controls and others to retrench.  According to this hypothesis, our earlier 
evidence reflects a combination of (a) upsizing target firms that add establishments and jobs 
more rapidly than controls and (b) downsizing target firms that shed jobs and establishments 
more rapidly than controls.  The positive effects of buyouts on creation, destruction, acquisitions, 
and divestitures then result by aggregating over upsizing and downsize cases. An alternative 
hypothesis  holds  that  private  equity  acts  as  an  agent  of  restructuring  within  target  firms, 
accelerating the reallocation of jobs across establishments of target firms and the pace of their 
divestitures and acquisitions.  According to this hypothesis, the positive effects of buyouts on 
gross job flows, acquisitions, and divestitures occur within target firms. These hypotheses are not 
exclusive because private equity may accelerate both types of creative destruction. 
To investigate these hypotheses, we estimate the impact of private equity transactions on 
various  firm-level  measures  of  reallocation  activity  in  the  wake  of  buyouts.  The  overall  job 
reallocation rate for a firm is the sum of its gross job gains due to new, expanding, and acquired 
establishments and its gross job losses due to exiting, shrinking, and divested establishments. A 
firm’s excess reallocation rate is the difference between its job reallocation rate and the absolute 
value of its net growth rate.
18 If a given firm changes employment in the same direction at all of 
its  establishments,  then  its  excess  reallocation  is  zero.    To  the  extent  that  a  firm  expands 
employment  at  some  units  and  contracts  employment  at  others,  it  has  positive  excess 
reallocation.  If the firm adds jobs at some of its establishments and cuts an equal number of jobs 
at other establishments, then excess reallocation equals job reallocation. 
                                                 
18 This concept of excess reallocation is often used in the literature on gross job flows to analyze the nature of job 
reallocation  within  and  between  industries  or  sectors.    See  Dunne,  Roberts,  and  Samuelson  (1989),  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger (1992), and, for a review of the literature, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).  Our approach here applies 
the concept to the reallocation of jobs across units within firms.   26
By estimating the impact of private equity transactions on excess and job reallocation 
rates at target firms (relative to controls), we can quantify the extent to which private equity acts 
as an agent of change or an agent of restructuring. For example, if private equity acts exclusively 
as an  agent of change,  then the entire creative  destruction response of  target firms involves 
higher job reallocation but no impact on firm-level excess reallocation.  At the other extreme, if 
private equity acts exclusively as agents of restructuring within target firms, then firm-level job 
reallocation  and  excess  reallocation  rates  respond  by  the  same  amount  to  private  equity 
transactions.  
Table 5 reports regression results for firm-level job reallocation and excess reallocation 
rates  using  the  same  specifications  and  two-year  horizon  as  in  Table  4.  In  the  ATE1 
Heterogeneous specification, the reallocation rate is 5.0 percentage points higher at targets for 
organic  employment  changes  and  13.3  points  higher  when  including  acquisitions  and 
divestitures.  These  results  confirm  our  previous  inference  that  private  equity  transactions 
substantially  accelerate  the  pace  of  creative  destruction  activity  at  target  firms.  The  excess 
reallocation rate is 5.6 points higher at target firms for organic changes, 8.8 points higher with 
acquisitions and divestitures. The implication is that the increase in job reallocation induced by 
buyout transactions mainly involves an accelerated pace of restructuring within target firms.  For 
organic changes, the impact of buyouts on excess reallocation is actually greater than the impact 
on job reallocation.
19  Thus, especially for organic employment changes, our evidence implies 
that private equity acts predominantly as an agent of restructuring within target firms.   
A limitation of the regression estimates in Tables 3, 4, and 5 is that they identify only the 
differences between targets and controls.  To recover information about the levels of creation and 
                                                 
19 By definition, overall job reallocation equals or exceeds job reallocation for a given firm or group of firms.  Our 
comparison here, however, involves the difference between job reallocation and excess reallocation responses for 
two distinct sets of firms, targets and controls.    27
destruction  activity,  we  return  to  the  nonparametric  approach  of  section  5  and  consider  a 
counterfactual  exercise  along  the  lines  of  Figure  5.    Specifically,  we  sort  target  and  control 
observations in our 1980-2003 firm-level analysis sample into cells defined by the same cross 
product of industry, size, age, multi-unit status, and transaction year as before.  For each cell, we 
calculate cumulative two-year changes post buyout for each employment adjustment margin.  
We do this separately for targets and controls. We then generate the weighted average outcomes 
for targets and controls using the same approach to weighting as in Figure 5. These calculations 
reveal the extent of creation and destruction activity on each adjustment margin at target firms, 
and they tell us how target firm activity would differ if they exhibited the same behavior as 
controls.     
We report the results of these calculations in Table 6. They show high rates of creation 
and  destruction  at  target  firms  in  the  wake  of  private  equity  transactions.  The  two-year 
cumulative job reallocation at target firms is 39 percent of employment for organic changes 
(Panel  A)  and  57  percent  with  acquisitions  and  divestitures  (Panel  B).  The  large  role  of 
establishment entry and exit at targets is especially striking. Greenfield entry accounts for 72 
percent of organic job creation at target firms, and establishment closures account for 66 percent 
of organic job destruction.  The pace of job creation and destruction due to establishment births 
and deaths is considerably slower at control firms.   
According to the “Difference” column in Panel A of Table 6, buyouts raise job creation, 
destruction and reallocation rates by, respectively, 1.8, 3.9 and 5.8 percent of transaction-year 
employment, which amount to 11, 20 and 17 percent of the base rates at control firms.  Panel B 
shows that the increases in creation, destruction, and reallocation associated with buyouts are 
considerably  larger,  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms,  when  including  acquisitions  and 
divestitures.  In  short,  we  find  that  private  equity  buyouts  accelerate  the  pace  of  firm-level   28
restructuring on every adjustment margin we measure. To check the consistency of these results 
with the semi-parametric regressions in Tables 4 and 5, the two rightmost columns in Panels A 
and B report the regression estimates of target-control differences. The two approaches yield 
very similar differences, and the differences are precisely estimated. 
Panel C summarizes the information in a different way by decomposing job reallocation 
separately for targets and controls.  The two-year job reallocation rate is 57 percent at targets and 
43 percent at controls.  Organic components account for about 70 percent of job reallocation at 
targets and a larger percent at controls.  Moreover, the organic component of within-firm excess 
reallocation accounts for a large share (about 35 percent) at both sets of firms.  Acquisitions and 
divestitures account for a larger share of job reallocation at targets.   
8.    Differential Responses by Period, Industry and Target Type 
  Thus far, we have characterized responses to private equity transactions for the private 
sector  as  a  whole,  and  obtained  similar  results  whether  we  posit  uniform  or  heterogeneous 
treatment  effects.    Nevertheless,  our  earlier  analysis  may  obscure  important  differences  in 
responses to private equity buyouts by time period, industry, or type of transaction.  We now 
investigate these differences, drawing on previous accounts and research for inspiration as to 
where there might be important differences. 
Descriptive  accounts  suggest  that  private  equity  groups  shifted  to  a  more  operational 
orientation over time, which could lead to time-varying responses at targets.  The scale of private 
equity buyout activity also increased enormously over time, which could alter the character of 
the marginal target and its post-buyout performance.  Motivated by these observations, in the 
web appendix we analyze the mean growth rate differences between private equity targets and 
control establishments for three periods.   The findings (see Figure B.2 of the web appendix) 
show that the main pattern documented earlier also holds for transactions in the 1980s, the 1990-  29
94 period, and the 1995-2000 period.  In each period, employment contracts more rapidly at 
targets than at controls in the years following buyout transactions.  
Some  accounts  of  private  equity  buyouts  paint  a  picture  of  aggressive  cost  cutting 
through layoffs.  This characterization suggests the potential for bigger job destruction responses 
to private equity buyouts in labor-intensive industries, reflecting the view that aggressive cost 
cutters focus on the biggest cost sources.  More generally, there are major differences in factor 
input  shares,  market  structure,  demand  conditions,  and  labor  relations  across  industries  that 
might lead to important differences in the responses to private equity buyouts.  Motivated by 
these ideas, Figure 9 displays results for three broad industry sectors that cover most private 
equity transactions.  Employment falls modestly at target establishments relative to controls post 
buyout in manufacturing.  Accounting for transaction-year outcomes as well, there is no material 
cumulative jobs effect of buyout transactions in the manufacturing sector.  Retail Trade exhibits 
a markedly different response pattern. In the years leading up to buyout transactions, controls 
and targets in the Retail Trade sector exhibit similar employment growth rates. Post buyout, 
however, employment at target establishments falls by nearly 12 percent relative to controls over 
five years. The Service sector exhibits yet a different pattern.  Targets grow much rapidly than 
controls prior to the transaction year but somewhat more slowly afterwards. Figure 9 serves as a 
caution against painting with an overly broad brush when characterizing employment outcomes 
in the wake of private equity buyouts. 
There  are  also  good  reasons  to  think  that  employment  responses  vary  by  type  of 
transaction.  For example, a desire to ease capital constraints and improve funding access may be 
more prevalent among independent firms that are privately held before the buyout.  Public-to-
private deals may be more likely to involve target firms with a strong need for cost cutting, as in 
the Beatrice case discussed by Baker (1992).  Alternatively, there could be a higher incidence of   30
poor execution in public-to-private deals.  Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) stress that large public-
to-private deals are concentrated at market peaks, where high valuations and extreme leverage 
levels are commonplace, and these transactions seem to encounter a disproportionate share of 
difficulties.  For instance, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find that 23% of larger public-to-private 
transactions  in  the  1980s  defaulted  at  some  point.  Guo  et  al.  (2011)  find  weak  operating 
performance  in  a  sample  of  public-to-private  transactions  undertaken  in  the  first  half  of  the 
2000s.  
  Motivated by these arguments, Table 7 reports the estimated effects of buyouts by type of 
private equity transaction based on our ATE1 Heterogeneous regression specification.  We report 
results for the response of the firm-level employment  growth rate and the response on each 
adjustment margin.  Each coefficient in Table 7 corresponds to the estimated average treatment 
effect on the treated in the indicated regression.  As in the earlier firm-level results, we focus on 
changes over a two-year horizon post buyout.   
Inspecting the top row in Table 7, employment growth rate responses differ greatly by 
type of private equity transaction.  In public-to-private transactions, target employment contracts 
by more than 10 percent relative to controls over two years. Target firms in public-to-private 
transactions  experience  substantially  greater  job  losses  due  to  establishment  deaths  and 
divestitures.  They also experience less job creation through establishment births.  Along with the 
high visibility of public-to-private deals, these results help to understand concerns about job loss 
related to private equity buyouts.  
In striking contrast, employment at independent targets (also known as private-to-private 
deals)  grows 10 percent relative to controls in  the first two  years post buyout.   More rapid 
employment growth at independent targets reflects a higher pace of acquisition, consistent with 
the view that private equity investments facilitate firm-level expansion.  It is worth stressing that   31
most buyout transactions involve independent targets, even though public-to-private transactions 
garner  much  more  attention.    In  terms  of  transaction-year  employment,  independent  targets 
account for about 63 percent more jobs than publicly held targets (Table 2).   
Table 7 also shows that divisional buyouts involve a pattern of results broadly similar to 
the ones in Tables 4 and 5 – modest net employment contractions at targets relative to controls 
and substantially higher rates of creation, destruction, acquisitions, and divestitures.  Secondary 
transactions involve net employment gains at targets relative to controls and a very high pace of 
excess  reallocation  driven,  largely  due  to  an  extraordinary  pace  of  creation  at  birth  and 
destruction at deaths.  Secondary buyouts account for a modest 11 percent of transaction-year 
employment for transactions that occurred from 1980 to 2003, and Other buyouts account for 
only 3 percent. 
  One common pattern emerges for all deal types in Table 7: excess reallocation rates are 
higher at target firms than at controls. The magnitude of the target-control difference in excess 
reallocation  varies  greatly  by  type  of  transaction,  but  it  is  positive  and  highly  statistically 
significant in all cases.  This result says private equity acts as an agent of restructuring at target 
firms in all of the transaction types we identify.   
9.   Conclusions and directions for future research  
Our study examines employment responses to private equity buyouts at a much more 
granular  level  than  earlier  work.  Compared  to  previous  research,  we  exploit  a  much  larger 
sample  of  transactions,  a  much  more  extensive  set  of  controls,  and  a  novel  ability  to  track 
outcomes  at  firms  and  establishments.  These  advantages  enable  us  to  overcome  important 
limitations in previous research and address controversies about employment outcomes.  We also 
exploit the strengths of our data to explore new questions about private equity’s role in the 
creative destruction process and its impact on restructuring activity inside target firms.     32
Our  findings  support  the  view  that  private  equity  deals  lead  to  greater  job  loss  at 
establishments  operated  by  target  firms  as  of  the  transaction  year.    Employment  at  these 
establishments shrinks by 3 percent relative to controls in the two-year period post buyout and by 
6  percent  over  five  years.    Gross  job  destruction  at  these  target  establishments  outpaces 
destruction at controls by a cumulative 10 percentage points over five years post buyout.  These 
results say that pre-existing employment positions are  at  greater  risk of loss in the wake of 
private equity buyouts. 
While noteworthy, these results make up only part of a richer and more interesting story 
about the employment effects of private equity.  Using our ability to track each firm’s constituent 
establishments,  we  estimate  how  employment  responds  to  private  equity  buyouts  on  several 
adjustment  margins,  including  job  creation  at  greenfield  establishments  opened  post  buyout.  
This aspect of our analysis reveals that target firms create new jobs in greenfield establishments 
at a faster pace than control firms. Accounting for greenfield job creation erases about one-third 
of the net employment growth differential in favor of controls. Accounting for the purchase and 
sale of establishments as well, the employment growth differential is less than 1 percent of initial 
employment over two years. 
Private equity buyouts involve much larger effects on the gross creation and destruction 
of jobs – both in the form of organic employment changes and in the acquisition and divestiture 
of  establishments.  The  job  reallocation  rate  at  target  firms  exceeds  that  of  controls  by  13.5 
percentage points over two years post buyout.  About 43 percent of the extra job reallocation 
reflects a more rapid pace of organic employment adjustments, and the rest reflects acquisitions 
and divestitures.   These novel findings provide evidence that private equity buyouts catalyse the 
creative  destruction  process  as  measured  by  gross  job  flows  and  the  purchase  and  sale  of 
business establishments.     33
Digging deeper, we also address two distinct hypotheses about the nature of the increased 
creative destruction activity associated with private equity buyouts.  One hypothesis sees private 
equity as agents of change in the sense that buyouts accelerate retrenchments at some target 
firms and they accelerate expansion at others.  Another hypothesis sees private equity as agents 
of restructuring in the sense that buyouts accelerate the reallocation of jobs across establishments 
within target firms.   We show that the restructuring effect predominates, especially for organic 
employment changes. 
Finally, we provide evidence that employment responses to private equity buyouts vary 
considerably across industries and by type of transaction.  The largest employment losses at 
targets relative to controls occur in Retail Trade.  Public-to-private deals, which tend to be highly 
visible,  also  involve  large  employment  losses  at  targets  relative  to  controls.    In  contrast, 
independently owned firms exhibit large employment gains relative to controls in the wake of 
buyouts, mainly due to greater acquisitions.  Private equity buyouts of independent firms are 
more numerous than public-to-private transactions, and they account for a larger share of jobs. 
By identifying a large sample of private equity transactions and linking them to the LBD, 
this paper also sets the stage for new research into the effects of private equity transactions on 
capital  expenditures,  productivity  growth,  compensation,  profitability,  and  other  outcomes. 
Simple measures of labor compensation and output per worker are available directly from the 
LBD.  A  much  richer  array  of  input  and  outcome  measures  are  available  at  the  firm  and 
establishment level in other Census Bureau data sets that can be linked to the LBD and our 
dataset of private equity transactions.  One example is the Longitudinal Research Database, a 
rich and widely used longitudinal source of data on manufacturing establishments.  Currently, we 
are using the LRD in combination with the dataset we constructed for this paper to study wage 
and productivity effects of private equity buyouts.   34
In  future  work,  we  plan  to  examine  employment  and  productivity  outcomes  in 
corporations that sell to private equity groups. Many divisional buyouts involve divestitures of 
underperforming units that may place heavy demands on senior management. Schoar (2002) 
documents that acquisitions can lead managers to neglect core businesses, a phenomenon she 
calls the “new toy” effect. The LBD will allow us to observe whether the same pattern operates 
in reverse when firms sell underperforming or poorly fitting divisions, thereby freeing senior 
management to focus on core activities.  
Finally,  we  wish  to  highlight  the  need  to  investigate  experiences  outside  the  United 
States. While U.S. private equity outcomes are especially interesting because of the industry’s 
large size and maturity, the U.S. experience may not reflect experiences in other countries.  The 
impact of private equity might differ across environments depending on corporate governance, 
financial depth, legal institutions, and economic development. While they lack our combination 
of  firm-level  and  establishment-level  data,  recent  works  by  Amess  and  Wright  (2007)  and 
Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) also consider employment outcomes in the wake of private 
equity transactions, using data for the United Kingdom and France, respectively.  
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Table 1.  Value of Private Equity Targets, Total and Matches by Time Period ($millions) 
 
  1980-1989  1990-1999  2000-2005 
Matched  73,209  169,271  291,824 
Total  122,115  211,615  420,245 
 
 
Table 2. Private Equity Transactions in the Analysis Samples 
 
















All, 1980-2005  3,218  573,224  151,529  5,828,532 
Private to Private  1,350  88,919  59,865  2,224,530 
Public to Private  390  261,164  36,717  1,371,129 
Divisional Sales   918  132,330  35,259  1,359,139 
Secondary Sales  396  72,969  13,455  637,591 
Other  164  17,841  6,233  236,143 
         
All, 1980-2003  2,265  431,871  103,671  4,323,558 
Excluding EIN cases  1,874  377,303  79,131  3,410,598 
Two-year continuers, 
excluding EIN cases  1,374  272,325  76,271  3,187,171 
Private to Private  686  58,287  37,283  1,470,447 
Public to Private  248  129,382  20,380  872,206 
Divisional Sales   206  38,874  7,922  391,705 
Secondary Sales  160  35,474  7,957  353,325 
Other  74  10,309  2,729  99,488 
         
All, 1980-2000  1,306  315,007  54,729  2,385,163 
Private to Private  647  60,865  24,593  901,284 
Public to Private  171  162,567  18,454  854,779 
Divisional Sales   342  60,615  6,557  416,055 
Secondary Sales  107  23,010  3,885  161,557 
Other  39  7,951  1,240  51,488 
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Table 3. Post-Transaction Employment Growth Rates at Target Establishments Relative to 
Controls, Transactions from 1980 to 2000 
 
  Nonparametric 
Comparison 
From Figure 6b 
Semi-Parametric Regressions 
ATE=ATE1  ATE1 
 Heterogeneous 
Buyout Year  2.17  2.08  2.28 
     (0.17)  (0.17) 
Buyout Year +1  -0.93  -0.72  -1.15 
     (0.20)  (0.20) 
+2  -2.23  -1.74  -1.76 
     (0.20)  (0.21) 
+3  -0.55  0.00  0.08 
     (0.21)  (0.21) 
+4  -1.64  -1.31  -1.16 
     (0.22)  (0.22) 
+5  -1.09  -0.95  -1.23 
     (0.22)  (0.23) 
Cumulative, Years 1 to 5  -6.44  -4.72  -5.22 
 
Notes: 
1.  Table entries report estimated employment growth rate differences between targets and 
controls in the buyout year and following years.  For example, the entries for “Buyout 
Year +2” report the estimated growth rate difference from Year 1 to Year 2 following the 
buyout.  Each reported coefficient is for a different nonparametric comparison or 
regression.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  They are computed by the delta method 
in the “ATE1 Heterogeneous” regression. 
2.  The nonparametric comparison reflects the patterns displayed in Figure 5b. As explained 
in the text, this comparison controls for the cross product of 72 two-digit industries, 10 
firm size categories, 6 firm age groups, multi-unit status, and transaction year. 
3.  The semi-parametric regressions control for two-digit industry, firm size categories, firm 
age categories, multi-unit status and transaction year plus two measures for the pre-
buyout growth history of the parent firm. The “ATE=ATE1” specification imposes a 
uniform treatment effect, while the “ATE1 Heterogeneous” specification allows the 
treatment effect to vary firm size category, firm age category and the pre-buyout growth 
history measures. 
4.  The average number of establishment-level observations in each regression or 
nonparametric comparison is about 4.9 million.  The observation count falls with each 
successive year following the transaction year because of target deaths and deleted 
observations for the corresponding control establishments.    
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Table 4. Buyout Effects on Target Firms Relative to Controls: Employment-Weighted 
Regression Estimates, Transactions from 1980 to 2003 
 
  Regression Specification 
ATE=ATE1  ATE1 
Heterogeneous 





0.07  -0.65 
(0.16) 
0.07 
         





0.09  -1.36 
(0.11) 
0.09 
Creation  -1.33 
(0.08) 
0.20  -1.18 
(0.07) 
0.20 
Destruction  0.24 
(0.07) 
































Notes:   
1.  Employment-weighted regressions based on a sample of Target and Control firms with 
growth rates calculated over two-year horizon from the event year t to t+2. Standard 
errors in parentheses.   
2.  The semi-parametric regression specifications in Table 4 include fully interacted 
industry, year, firm age, firm size and multi-unit effects plus additional controls for pre-
buyout growth history.  The “ATE=ATE1” specification imposes a uniform treatment 
effect, while the “ATE1 Heterogeneous” specification allows the treatment effect to vary 
by firm size, firm age, and the two measures of pre-buyout growth history.  
3.  Each regression has 1,985,489 observations.   47
Table 5. Estimated Effects of Buyouts on Excess Reallocation and Total Job Reallocation at 
the Firm Level, Transactions from 1980 to 2003 
 
 
  Regression Specification 





￿￿  Buyout 
Effect 
￿￿ 
Firm-level Excess Reallocation – 
All Adjustment Margins 
8.00  0.26  8.08  0.26 
(0.07)    (0.07)   
Firm-level Excess Reallocation – 
Births, Deaths & Continuers 
5.52  0.27  5.58  0.27 
(0.07)    (0.07)   
Firm-level Job Reallocation –  
All Adjustment Margins 
13.18  0.17  13.28  0.17 
(0.15)    (0.15)   
Firm-level Job Reallocation – 
Births, Deaths & Continuers 
4.82  0.20  5.00  0.20 




1.  Employment-weighted regressions based on a sample of Target and Control firms with 
growth rates calculated over two-year horizon from the event year t to t+2. Standard 
errors in parentheses.   
2.  The semi-parametric regression specifications in Table 5 include fully interacted 
industry, year, firm age, firm size and multi-unit effects plus additional controls for pre-
buyout growth history.  The “ATE=ATE1” specification imposes a uniform treatment 
effect, while the “ATE1 Heterogeneous” specification allows the treatment effect to vary 
by firm size, firm age, and the two measures of pre-buyout growth history.  
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 Table 6.  Private Equity and Reallocation, Cumulative Outcomes over Years 1 and 2 Post 
Transaction for Transactions from 1980 to 2003 
 
A. Organic Changes, Excluding Acquisitions and Divestitures 
Rates Expressed as a 







From Tables 3 and 4 
Difference  Standard Error 
Job Creation  18.60  16.79  1.80  0.69  (0.10) 
Continuers   5.20  5.63  -0.43  -1.18  (0.07) 
Births  13.40  11.17  2.23  1.87  (0.00) 
Job Destruction  20.36  16.42  3.94  4.31  (0.11) 
Continuers  6.94  6.71  0.23  0.18  (0.06) 
Deaths  13.42  9.70  3.71  4.13  (0.08) 
Employment Growth*  -1.77  0.38  -2.14     




37.19  32.83  4.36     
20.39  15.03  5.36  5.58  (0.13) 
16.81  17.80  -1.00     
 
B. All Adjustment Margins, Including Acquisitions and Divestitures 
Rates Expressed as a 







From Tables 3 and 4 
Difference  Standard Error 
Job Creation  29.48  22.23  7.25  6.25  (0.11) 
Job Destruction  27.28  21.06  6.21  7.03  (0.13) 
Employment Growth  2.21  1.17  1.04  -0.65  (0.16) 




54.55  42.12  12.43     
26.16  18.27  7.89  8.08  (0.07) 
28.39  23.85  4.54     
 
C. Level and Decomposition of Job Reallocation  
  Target Firms  Control Firms 
Job Reallocation as a Percent of 
Transaction-Year Employment  56.76  43.29 
Components, as Percent of Total     
Net Employment Change, Organic  3.11  0.87 
Within-Firm Excess Reallocation, Organic  35.92  34.72 
Between-Firm Excess Reallocation, Organic  29.61  41.12 
Net Employment Change, A&D  7.00  1.84 
Excess Reallocation, A&D  27.47  20.59 
Notes:  
1.  An asterisk in Panels A and B denotes values derived from the following identities:  First, job 
creation minus job destruction equals the net employment change. Second, total job reallocation 
equals organic job reallocation plus job reallocation due to acquisitions and divestitures.  Third, 
job reallocation is the sum of an absolute employment change and excess reallocation.  Fourth, 
excess reallocation is the sum of within-firm (firm-level) and between-firm components. See 
Section 2.3 in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) for a development and explicit statement of the first, 
third and fourth identities. 
2.  “A&D” refers to Acquisitions and Divestitures. 
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Table 7 Buyout Effects on Target Firms Relative to Controls by Type of Transaction and 
Adjustment Margin, Transactions from 1980 to 2003 
 














-10.36  10.51  -1.47  7.15  -6.45 
(0.42)  (0.24)  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.80) 
 
Adjustment Margin 
         
Continuers  1.40  1.44  -1.42  3.11  -1.84 
  (0.25)  (0.16)  (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.56) 
Divestitures  6.80  0.15  5.34  -0.06  -1.52 
  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.19) 
Deaths  5.95  1.50  5.97  12.14  9.28 
  (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.23)  (0.30)  (0.44) 
Births  -3.12  -0.38  3.32  17.23  1.5 
  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.25) 
Acquisitions  3.98  10.98  7.61  -1.21  1.7 
  (0.25)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.21) 
Job Creation All  -0.29  9.64  9.19  20.09  1.32 
  (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.50) 
Job Destruction All  11.06  -0.88  10.34  12.04  7.84 
  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.40)  (0.56) 
Excess Reallocation All  2.14  1.67  13.65  32.25  5.29 
  (0.20)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.26)  (0.35) 
Number of Observations  289,228  1,269,396  456,135  168,508  122613 
 
Notes:   
1.  See notes to Table 4 for the ATE1 Heterogeneous specification. 
 